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RESOLUTION, ORDERLY AND OTHERWISE: B OF A IN OLA 
Stephen J. Lubben 
Since the recent collapse of Lehman Brothers, the problems 
associated with large, complex financial institutions have been front and 
center.1  Questions remain about how best to handle insolvency, 
bankruptcy, or “resolution” of such an institution.2 
The discussion is more difficult still because of the high political and 
financial stakes.  For those steeped in the banking industry, maintaining 
the “specialness” of banks and financial institutions necessitates 
denigrating the bankruptcy system.3  The Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC or Corporation),4 keen to demonstrate its 
competency to wield the new powers given it under Dodd–Frank, rushed 
to produce a hypothetical resolution of Lehman that amused many by its 
 
  Harvey Washington Wiley Chair in Corporate Governance & Business Ethics, Seton Hall 
University School of Law, Newark, New Jersey.  Many thanks to Anna Gelpern, Kristin N. Johnson, 
Adam Levitin, Michael Macchiarola, Frank Medina, Frank Partnoy, and Michael Simkovic for their 
comments on an early draft.  Thanks also to the participants in the 25th Annual Corporate Law 
Symposium at the University of Cincinnati College of Law for their thoughts on the paper.  This paper 
is dedicated to Sarah Pei Woo, my co-author all too briefly.  I will always wonder what might have 
been. 
 1. See, e.g., Anna Gelpern, Financial Crisis Containment, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1051 (2009); 
Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435 (2011); Michael C. Macchiarola, Beware of 
Risk Everywhere: An Important Lesson from the Current Credit Crisis, 5 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 267 
(2009); Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA L. REV. 183 
(2009); Hal S. Scott, The Reduction of Systemic Risk in the United States Financial System, 33 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 671 (2010); William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943 
(2009); Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2010); Arthur E. 
Wilmarth, Jr., Reforming Financial Regulation to Address the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 35 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 707 (2010); Sarah Pei Woo, Regulatory Bankruptcy: How Bank Regulation Causes Fire Sales, 
99 GEO. L.J. 1615 (2011). 
 2. See Stephen J. Lubben, Financial Institutions in Bankruptcy, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1259 
(2011).  As David Zaring explains: 
Resolution authority is the polite term for seizing failing financial institutions and either 
shutting them down or selling them off for the best possible price. Resolution is meant to 
be implemented before contagion sets in and the institutions’ counterparties, including 
customers, traders, and even competitors, also fail, either through panic (which is not the 
fault of the counterparties) or poor risk management (which is, but still may exacerbate a 
crisis).  It is a particular kind of instant bankruptcy, destroying the interests of some 
creditors quickly and unmercifully, while giving others, especially the bank’s depositors, 
a fresh and happy start. 
David Zaring, A Lack of Resolution, 60 EMORY L.J. 97, 99 (2010). 
 3. Rodgin Cohen & Morris Goldstein, The Case for an Orderly Resolution Regime for 
Systemically-Important Financial Institutions, in PEW FINANCIAL REPORT PROJECT (2009), available at 
http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/Policy%20page/Cohen-Goldstein-FINAL-TF-Correction.pdf. 
 4. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., THE ORDERLY LIQUIDATION OF LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS 
INC. UNDER THE DODD–FRANK ACT (2011), available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/0a72e3a2-6948-
11e0-9040-00144feab49a.pdf. 
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naiveté.5 
On the other hand, other commentators, in thrall to the healing 
powers of markets, have embraced the existing bankruptcy mechanisms 
as the best way to address the issue.6  In the process, they tend to ignore 
the obvious differences between a corporation with tangible assets and 
one whose primary asset is the trust its counterparties place in it.7  
Unlike a manufacturing plant, trust is apt to be quite vaporous in times 
of financial distress.8 
This Article takes a step back from this debate and considers the issue 
from a more practical level.  What precisely does it mean to “resolve” 
financial distress in a complex financial institution?9  What are the 
goals—liquidation, reorganization, or simple contagion avoidance?10  
And, more precisely, how might such a resolution look under realistic 
conditions?  Embedded in these questions are larger questions of who 
gets to make these choices, and under what circumstances the choices 
might change. 
I begin by examining the legal and financial structure of a specific, 
actual financial institution: Bank of America.  The financial institution 
in question is one of the “really big” institutions in the United States, 
and is selected as a representative of its type.11  This institution is not 
presently—the best I know—in danger of default or in need of 
resolution, but someday it might be.12 
If the FDIC were to resolve this institution under the new Orderly 
 
 5. Stephen J. Lubben, The F.D.I.C.’s Lehman Fantasy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2011), available 
at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/04/29/the-f-d-i-c-s-lehman-fantasy/; Michael H. Krimminger, No 
Fantasy in F.D.I.C. Lehman Paper, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2011, available at 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/05/03/no-fantasy-in-f-d-i-c-lehman-paper/; see also The Orderly 
Liquidation of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, 5 FDIC Q. 1 (2011). 
 6. John B. Taylor, How to Avoid the New Bailout Authority, ECONOMICS ONE (May 5, 2011), 
http://johnbtaylorsblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/how-to-avoid-new-bailout-authority.html. 
 7. See, e.g., Brent J. Horton, How Dodd–Frank’s Orderly Liquidation Authority for Financial 
Companies Violates Article III of the United States Constitution, 36 J. CORP. L. 869 (2011). 
 8. See Stephen J. Lubben, Systemic Risk & Chapter 11, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 433, 446–47 (2009) 
(arguing that chapter 11 can be used to resolve systemically important firms like the automotive firms, 
to the extent they are systematically important); see also Ryan Lizza, The Contrarian: Sheila Bair and 
the White House Financial Debate, NEW YORKER (July 6, 2009), available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/07/06/090706fa_fact_lizza. 
 9. See Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5 
(2007) (“Bankruptcy offers three alternatives for addressing the problems of a large public company in 
financial distress. The debtor may reorganize the business, sell it as a going concern, or close the 
business and sell the assets piecemeal.”). 
 10. Cf. Cheryl D. Block, Overt and Covert Bailouts: Developing a Public Bailout Policy, 67 IND. 
L.J. 951, 968–72 (1992). 
 11. Matt Taibbi, Bank of America: Too Crooked to Fail, ROLLING STONE (Mar. 14, 2012), 
available at http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/bank-of-america-too-crooked-to-fail-20120314.  
 12. Susanne Craig, Bank Stocks Get a Boost from Geithner, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2011), available 
at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/06/bank-stocks-get-a-boost-from-geithner/.  
2
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss2/4
2012] B OF A IN OLA 487 
Liquidation Authority in Dodd–Frank,13 it would first have to 
understand the business in question.  It would be aided in this process by 
the resolution plans—or “living wills”—that Dodd–Frank requires such 
institutions to prepare and file.14  The financial institution I examine in 
this paper has yet to file such a plan—it is not yet required to under 
recently enacted regulations—and when it does so, only parts will be 
public.15 But it is possible to gain an honest understanding of the 
financial institution using existing regulatory reports and other 
information made public by the institution. 
What this analysis reveals is that no matter how complex Lehman 
was, the remaining “too big to fail” financial institutions are infinitely 
more complex.  Lehman involved myriad legal entities, across several 
key financial jurisdictions, but it largely involved a single line of 
business.16  On the other hand, most of the remaining large financial 
institutions involve not only investment banking, but also commercial 
banking and sometimes insurance underwriting.17  The commercial 
banking operations, in particular, mean that these institutions are 
integrated into the real economy to a far greater degree than Lehman, 
and are therefore likely to fail in even more disruptive ways.18 
Moreover, all of these institutions have balances sheets that are much, 
much larger than Lehman’s—which itself was the largest chapter 11 
debtor ever.19  For example, Lehman reported assets of $713 billion 
upon filing for bankruptcy, whereas the institution I look at in this paper 
reported $2.3 trillion in assets at the end of 2010.20  By way of context, 
the World Bank estimates the United States GDP was estimated at $14.5 
Trillion in 2010.21 
 
 13. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381–94 (2010). 
 14. 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d) (2010).  This provision requires, among other things, “full descriptions 
of the ownership structure, assets, liability, and contractual obligations of the company . . . .” 
 15. Stephen J. Lubben, The Problem with Living Wills for Financial Terms, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
16, 2011), available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/09/16/the-problem-with-living-wills-for-
financial-firms/.  See also generally 12 C.F.R. § 381 (2011). 
 16. See Stephen J. Lubben & Sarah Pei Woo, Reconceptualizing Lehman, 49 TEX. INT’L L.J. 
(forthcoming 2013). 
 17. Howell E. Jackson, The Expanding Obligations of Financial Holding Companies, 107 HARV. 
L. REV.  507, 509 (1994). 
 18. Martin Wolf, Of Course It’s Right to Ringfence Rogue Universals, FIN. TIMES (Sep. 15, 
2011, 7:51 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f296cc8e-dedc-11e0-9130-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2GB19Of7H. 
 19. See Kristin N. Johnson, From Diagnosing the Dilemma to Divining a Cure: Post-Crisis 
Regulation of Financial Markets, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1299, 1311 (2010). 
 20. The Lehman holding company chapter 11 case is In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., No. 08-
13555 (JMP), while the liquidation proceeding under the Securities Investor Protection Act for the 
brokerage operation is In re Lehman Brothers Inc., No. 08-01420 (JMP) (SIPA), both in U.S. 
Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York. 
 21. WORLDBANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE, 
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Once the relevant pieces of the institution are identified, in Part II of 
this Article I examine the relevant law that would apply to resolution of 
the financial institution’s financial distress.  I begin with the assumption 
that Dodd–Frank’s Orderly Liquidation Authority will be invoked, but 
the fact that I have to make such an assumption itself reveals some basic 
uncertainty regarding how to anticipate and price financial distress in 
this context. 
Even after I decide to invoke the OLA regime, the question of which 
law will apply to my targeted financial institution remains an issue.  
First, OLA partially invokes other legal regimes to address parts of the 
financial institution.  Second, OLA is incomplete in its preemption of 
other insolvency regimes. 
And of course, OLA only applies domestically.  As will be seen, not 
only does the financial institution I examine conduct extensive 
operations abroad, but it also specifically targets investors in other 
jurisdictions.  For example, it has extensive asset securitization 
operations in Canada and the United Kingdom.  And recently, it has 
issued several billion dollars of debt denominated in Australian Dollars, 
Swiss Francs, Canadian Dollars, Japanese Yen, and Euros.  Many of 
these debt issuances also involve interest rates that float based on the 
movements of a local interest rate index.  Presumably, these indices are 
sensitive to local economic conditions. 
While the FDIC, as a potential trustee of the financial institution in 
question, would have but a limited ability to change the legal outcomes 
in foreign jurisdictions, it must plan for the effects its actions will have 
worldwide, particularly if those actions will rebound into the United 
States.  For example, when Lehman filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in 
the United States, its London operations immediately entered 
administration in the United Kingdom.  That had serious consequences 
for several U.S.-based hedge funds that relied on Lehman’s London 
operations for their prime brokerage accounts.22 
Having then provided a picture of the financial institution and the 
legal landscape that would apply upon financial distress, Part III of the 
Article considers the interaction of these two elements.  This is the core 
of the Article, as it addresses the vital question of “what would 
happen?” 





 22. See Lawrence Cohen, Update on Claims for Lehman Prime Brokerage Assets, GIBBONS 
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recent crisis, but I try to avoid assuming the kind of perfection seen in 
the FDICs recent Lehman exercise.  After all, the French government 
learned the lessons of World War I, and it was well-poised to act if 
Germany acted in the same manner as it had in 1914.  Quite obviously, 
that did not mean that France was ready to respond to a different, yet 
similar, threat in 1940. 
In short, I assume that the FDIC is somewhat prepared and well-
intentioned, but not omnipotent. 
In Part III, I also consider how the FDIC’s efforts to prepare an 
institution for an OLA proceeding might decrease the time the FDIC has 
to actually make such preparations.  This is the great paradox 
understood by reorganization professionals everywhere: the more 
preparation that is done for the filing, the greater the risk of an early or 
uncontrolled filing, because of premature disclosure of the debtor’s 
plans.  The FDIC has some experience hiding its preliminary work in 
the bank resolution context, but I also examine the ways in which OLA 
might be different. 
Moreover, in the specific context of financial institutions, I explore 
how financial distress in the financial institution I am studying will 
likely result in doubts about the viability of other financial institutions 
(i.e., financial contagion), in varying intensity depending on the 
similarities between the respective institutions.  Not only does this have 
a feedback effect with regard to the original financial institution, but it 
also limits the FDIC’s ability to focus its efforts solely on the first 
institution. 
At some point the preplanning inexorably gives way to an actual 
Dodd–Frank OLA proceeding.  As explained more fully in Part III, this 
is the point at which FDIC will have to manage the main proceeding 
while also coordinating related insolvency proceedings at home and 
abroad.  The liquidity needs of the distressed financial institution are apt 
to be extreme in these initial days, but providing such liquidity will be 
key to containing the financial distress within a single institution.  
The FDIC will also have to be vigilant, ready to respond to 
unforeseen complications and the unforeseen actions of rogue 
counterparties who decide that their best course of action lies in self-
help. 
Once the financial institution is stabilized, the FDIC must be prepared 
to describe what will happen to the institution and must achieve that 
result in rapid fashion.  At the same time, the Corporation will need to 
gain an understanding of the claims against the financial institution and 
implement plans for paying such claims.  Throughout the key question 
will be, “can this be done quicker than it could under the Bankruptcy 
Code?”  When the U.S. government conducted a similar exercise during 
5
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the financial crisis with regard to AIG, it seems likely that it overpaid 
AIG’s counterparties relative to what they would have obtained in a 
chapter 11 case. 
Part IV then concludes by considering the implications of the story 
told in Part III.  While Part III reveals some serious doubts about the 
ability of Dodd–Frank to perform as envisioned, it also shows how the 
Bankruptcy Code, at least as currently drafted, would be equally 
unsuited to the task.  Moreover, I explain why adapting the Code to the 
resolution of large financial institutions would involved something far 
more substantial than a few “tweaks,” as is often suggested.  Ultimately 
it would involve adopting something that takes many features from both 
OLA and chapter 11, while applying the name bankruptcy to the 
resulting beast.  I have argued elsewhere that greater integration of OLA 
and the Bankruptcy Code would be highly desirable, but we should not 
pretend it will be an easy task. 
I. THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTION 
In this paper I examine Bank of America, a large universal bank—or 
as close to a universal bank as is possible in the United States—which is 
headed by the BankAmerica Corporation or Bank of America 
Corporation, a Delaware corporation originally called NationsBank 
(DE) Corporation.23 
Already large, between 2006 and 2008, Bank of America acquired 
several other institutions, including Countrywide Financial, Merrill 
Lynch, MBNA, U.S. Trust, and La Salle Bank.  As of December 31, 
2010, the entire bank had $2.3 trillion in assets and approximately 
288,000 full-time equivalent employees.24  Its broker–dealer units hold 
more than $2.2 trillion in client assets.  The bank reports that in the 
United States alone it has more than 57 million consumer and small 
business banking relationships, and the bank held more than $1 trillion 
in banking deposits.  The company has approximately 5,900 retail 
banking locations and 18,000 ATMs throughout the United States. 
The parent company’s offices are located in Charlotte, North 
Carolina, and its shares are listed on the New York, London, and Tokyo 
stock exchanges.25  It also has more than two-dozen types of preferred 
 
 23. Whether the parent company is Bank of America Corporation or BankAmerica Corporation 
is a bit unclear, since the certificate of incorporation uses both names.  Paragraph one of certificate does 
state that “The name of the corporation is Bank of America Corporation,” but the introductory paragraph 
and the title use the other name. Bank of America Corp., Amended and Restated Certificate of 
Incorporation (Form 8-K) (Aug. 1, 2006), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/70858/000119312507042036/dex3a.htm. 
 24. Bank of America Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 25, 2011). 
 25. Id.  With regard to the discussion of the subsidiaries I recoded the data to correct obvious 
6
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shares that are listed on the NYSE. 
Table 1: Bank of America Capital  
(as of June 2011, in millions of USD) 
 
 
Perpetual Preferred 16,562.20 
Common Stock 101.33 
Surplus 151,465.35 
Undivided Profits 53,254.47 
Total Capital 222,175.60 
 
In a broad sense, Bank of America is comprised of two halves: the 
original Bank of America, and Merrill Lynch, the investment bank it 
acquired on the same day that Lehman filed its chapter 11 petition.26  
But the two halves of the bank have been somewhat integrated—for 
example, previously outstanding Merrill preferred shares were reissued 
by the Bank of America parent company on substantially the same 
terms, giving the holders a stake in the combined enterprise, rather than 
just the Merrill piece of the operation. 
A. Corporate Structure 
At the end of 2010, Bank of America, the parent company, had more 
than 2,000 subsidiaries worldwide, formed in ninety-seven different 
jurisdictions.  About forty-five percent of the Bank of America 
subsidiaries are formed in Delaware.  Just over thirty-eight percent of 
Bank of America’s subsidiaries were formed under the law of a foreign 
jurisdiction.27 These subsidiaries conduct their business operations in 
163 different cities around the world.  And while the bank has its 
 
errors.  For example, the list of subsidiaries includes separate categories labeled United Kingdom, 
England, and England & Wales, which have been combined in Table 1 under the United Kingdom 
category.  Note, however, that Scotland remains a separate entry on the table, with five subsidiaries.  I 
have assumed that references to Georgia refer to the American state. 
 26. See generally GREG FARRELL, CRASH OF THE TITANS: GREED, HUBRIS, THE FALL OF 
MERRILL LYNCH, AND THE NEAR-COLLAPSE OF BANK OF AMERICA (2010) (describing the events, 
particularly increasing investments in CDOs, that lead to Merrill’s need for a takeover). 
 27. Defined as other than the fifty United States and the District of Columbia. 
7
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corporate headquarters in North Carolina, New York City is the location 
of the largest number of its companies. 
Six hundred and thirty-one of the bank’s more than two thousand 
subsidiaries, or about 31% percent, are operated from locations outside 
of the United States.  When the 150 companies located in London are 
combined with the other subsidiaries sprinkled about the UK—such as 
the two subsidiaries in Hertfordshire and the one in Manchester—it 
becomes clear that the United Kingdom is the single largest foreign 
jurisdiction with respect to Bank of America’s overseas operations. 
Table 2: Bank of America Key Operating Subsidiaries  
(as of June 2011) 
 
 Description Location Formation 
Jurisdiction 
Outstanding Debt 
(named entity only) 
MBNA Canada Bank Credit cards Gloucester, Canada Canada 0 
Merrill Lynch Canada Inc. Investment bank 
Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada Canada 0 
Merrill Lynch Capital 




trading?) Houston, TX Delaware 0 
Merrill Lynch Government 
Securities Inc. 
US Government 
securities New York, NY Delaware 0 
Merrill Lynch Professional 
Clearing Corp. Unknown New York, NY Delaware 0 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith 
Incorporated 
Investment bank; 
holding co. New York, NY Delaware 0 




trading in London Dublin, Ireland Ireland 0 
Merrill Lynch Japan 
Securities Co., Ltd. Investment bank Tokyo, Japan Japan 0 
Merrill Lynch S.A. Investment bank 
Luxembourg, 
Luxembourg Luxembourg 3,285 




bank?) London, U.K. 
United 
Kingdom 0 




lending sub Chester, England 
United 
Kingdom 0 
Merrill Lynch Commodities 
(Europe) Limited Derivatives London, U.K. 
United 
Kingdom 0 
Merrill Lynch International Broker-dealer London, U.K. 
United 
Kingdom 0 
Bank of America Rhode 
Island, National Association Commercial bank Providence, RI USA 0 
Bank of America, National 
Association Commercial bank Charlotte, NC USA 6,659 
FIA Card Services, National 
Association Credit cards Wilmington, DE USA 1,000 
Source: http://investor.bankofamerica.com/ and Bloomberg 
 
The largest number of subsidiaries, and the bank’s corporate 
headquarters, are located in obvious financial centers, but there are some 
8
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surprises too.  With all due respect to Montevideo, six subsidiaries 
operating out of that city might give us pause. 
Many of the companies among the thousands that make up Bank of 
America are likely to be of little significance.  But in a world where a 
recent college graduate can incur $2 billion in losses at a major bank, we 
should not be too quick to dismiss any seemingly small piece of the 
overall picture. 
With that proviso, in June of 2011, Bank of America identified 
seventeen subsidiaries as among its “major operating subsidiaries.”28  As 
shown on Table 2, these companies are located in a variety of 
jurisdictions in the United States, Canada, Japan, and Europe.  These 
companies include three nationally chartered banks, which are subject to 
direct regulation by the Controller of the Currency and the FDIC. 
Table 3: Bank of America Assets by Location 
 
 USD % 
Total Assets 2,264,909 100 
Domestic 1,938,417 85.58 
Total Foreign excluding North 
America 310,392 13.7 
Europe, Middle East and Africa 186,045 8.21 
Asia 106,186 4.69 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 18,161 .8 
Canada 16,100 .71 
 
MBNA Canada Bank is a major credit card issuer in Canada, which 
Bank of America sold to TD Bank in late 2011.29  Merrill Lynch Capital 
Services, Inc. is primary derivatives counterparty in the Merrill Lynch 
part of Bank of America. 
Merrill Lynch Canada Inc. is an investment-banking arm of Merrill 
Lynch & Co. Canada Ltd., which itself is a subsidiary of Merrill Lynch 
Canada Holdings Co., Merrill’s top level Canadian holding company.  
This makes Merrill Lynch Canada similar to Merrill Lynch SA, which is 
Merrill’s continental European investment banking arm.   
 
 28. BANK OF AM. CORP., SELECT MAJOR SUBSIDIARIES (2011) [hereinafter SELECT MAJOR 
SUBSIDIARIES], available at http://phx.corporate-
ir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9OTk3OTF8Q2hpbGRJRD0tMXxUeXBlPTM=&t=1.  
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Interestingly, some of the entities listed by Bank of America as key 
subsidiaries do not appear in Bloomberg or other key financial 
databases.  For example, Merrill Lynch Commodities, Inc. is a 
subsidiary of MLCI Holdings, Inc., which itself is a subsidiary of 
Merrill Lynch Capital Services, the derivatives trader noted earlier.  
What precisely Merrill Lynch Commodities does is apparently unknown 
to Bloomberg.  I hazard a guess that this entity is involved in energy 
related trading, given its place in the overall corporate structure and its 
location in Houston, but we can hope that the FDIC will have better 
information than Bloomberg on points like these. 
Even more interesting is how little of Bank of America’s balance 
sheet appears on Table 2.  For example, the bank reports more than $800 
billion in total outstanding debt.  Just under $11 billion of that appears 
on the table.  But this is consistent with prior research that the late Sarah 
Woo and myself previously conducted on Lehman: much of the debt 
was issued by relatively insignificant subsidiaries, created to take 
advantage of regulatory or tax advantages of a particular jurisdiction.30 
Similarly, subsidiaries like Merrill Lynch UK Holdings Limited do 
not appear on Table 2, despite reporting more than $155 billion in risk-
weighted assets.31  As it turns out, this makes sense in the strictly literal 
sense that Merrill Lynch UK Holdings is a holding company, with no 
independent operations.  But given that Table 3 shows that Bank of 
America has but $188 billion of assets in the whole of Europe, the 
Middle East, and Africa, Merrill Lynch UK Holdings’ subsidiaries must 
carry a particular degree of risk (as defined in the Basel accords) or 
significance.32  In fact, Merrill Lynch UK Holdings is the holding 
company for Merrill Lynch International (MLI) and Merrill Lynch 
Commodities (Europe) Limited (MLCE), two of the key subsidiaries 
identified on Table 2.  As reported by Bank of America, MLI acts as a 
broker–dealer in financial instruments and provides “corporate finance 
services . . . .  MLCE is a trader of natural gas, electricity, coal, 
emissions and weather derivatives.”33 
 
 
 30. See Lubben & Woo, supra note 16; see also Gillian Tett, Idea of “Living Wills” Is Likely to 
Die Quiet Death, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2009, 7:50 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/098ac1ec-882d-
11de-82e4-00144feabdc0.html. 
 31. BANK AM., http://investor.bankofamerica.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=71595&p=irol-basel (last 
visited Sep. 19, 2012). 
 32. See infra Table 3, for more on MLI. 
 33. BANK OF AM., PILLAR 3 DISCLOSURES (2009), http://phx.corporate-
ir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9NzUwMjB8Q2hpbGRJRD0tMXxUeXBlPTM=&t=1. 
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Table 4: Bank of America Revenues by Location (2010) 
 
 USD % 
Net Revenues 110,220 100 
Domestic 87,179 79.1 
Total Foreign Excluding 
North America 21,541 19.54 
Europe, Middle East and Africa 12,369 11.22 
Asia 6,115 5.55 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 3,057 2.77 
Canada 1,500 1.36 
 
Taken together, Tables 2 through 4 provide a picture of a bank whose 
key subsidiaries are spread across the globe, while much of its assets 
and revenues are still associated with the United States.  That is, even 
though many Bank of America entities operate overseas, they often 
facilitate trading with American counterparties.  The following table, 
reproduced from the Basel II Pillar 3 Report on MLI, best illustrates 
this.  Recall that MLI is a London-based broker–dealer, yet more than 
half of its credit exposure relates back to the “Americas,” a rather vague 
term to be sure. 
And it is possible that the location of the assets (see Table 3)—may 
be something of a mirage, once the risk of rehypothecation is taken into 
account.34  Rehypothecation of collateral involves the reuse of client 
assets in a new transaction, as if a pawnshop could grant its own lenders 
a lien or similar rights in items left at the store by customers.  Many of 
Lehman’s prime brokerage customers claimed to be surprised that their 
assets had moved to Europe.  While contracting will address that 
specific problem, other related issues remain. 
 
 34. See Manmohan Singh & James Aitken, The (Sizeable) Role of Rehypothecation in the 
Shadow Banking System (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 10/172, July 2010), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/wp10172.pdf. 
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Table 6: Bank of America Balance Sheet (USD Millions) 
  FQ2 2011 
Balance Sheet - 
Assets   
 
+ Cash and Due from Depository 
Institutions 138,389.21 
 + Trading Account Assets 253,123.18 
 + Total Securities 351,463.11 
 + Federal Funds & Reverse Repos 259,708.37 
 + Net Loans and Leases 923,898.92 
 + Bank Premises and Fixed Assets 13,792.69 
 + Other Real Estate Owned 3,915.80 
 + Goodwill and Other Intangibles 92,891.39 
 + All Other Assets 194,135.15 
 Total Assets 2,264,435.84 
   
Balance Sheet - 
Liabilities   
 + Total Deposits 1,040,171.86 
 
+ Federal Funds & Repurchase 
Agreements 239,520.83 
 + Trading Liabilities 128,299.95 
 + Other Borrowed Funds 406,814.47 
 + Subordinated Debt 45,678.69 
 + All Other Liabilities 154,843.60 
 Total Liabilities 2,041,102.95 
   
Balance Sheet - 
Equity   
 + Perpetual Preferred 16,562.20 
 + Common Stock 101.33 
 + Surplus 151,465.35 
 + Undivided Profits 53,254.47 
 Total Capital 222,175.60 
 
The bank reports $420 billion in short-term borrowing, including 
about $50 billion in money market borrowing and $250 billion in repo-
related borrowing, and more than $1 trillion in deposits, divided 
between almost $950 billion in domestic deposits and $90 billion in 
foreign deposits.  These sources of funding are apt to be the unstable 
13
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when a financial institution encounters financial distress.39  For example, 
the foreign depositors do not benefit from FDIC insurance, and thus 
might be especially likely to flee at the first signs of stress.  And a “run” 
in repo financing is widely blamed for Lehman’s ultimate collapse.40 
Even more importantly for purposes of this paper, these unstable 
short term sources of funding show the potential liquidity needs of the 
bank during a resolution process.  As noted in the bank’s 2010 Form 10-
K: 
If Bank of America Corporation’s or Bank of America, N.A.’s 
commercial paper or short-term credit ratings . . . were downgraded by 
one or more levels, the potential loss of short-term funding sources such 
as commercial paper or repurchase agreement financing and the effect on 
our incremental cost of funds would be material.41 
As of September 2011, Bank of America had exactly one thousand 
different types of debt traded, with an average (median) duration of just 
over 5.6 (5.0) years.42  Much of the longer dated debt was issued in the 
mid to late 1990s. 
Table 7 shows the currency of each of these debt instruments.  While 
none of the banks’ significant operating companies were located in 
Australia or in Continental Europe, we can see from the table that these 











 39. See Karen Brettell & Jonathan Spicer, Update 2—Repo Market Reform Delayed Despite Fed 
Push—Sources, REUTERS (Feb. 9, 2012, 4:25 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/09/financial-
regulation-triparty-fed-idUSL2E8D9HJU20120209. 
 40. See generally GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007 
(2010); Actions by the New York Fed in Response to Liquidity Pressures in Financial Markets: Before 
the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Timothy F. 
Geithner, President and Chief Executive Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of New York). 
 41. Bank of America Corp., Form 10-K, supra note 24, at 7. 
 42. As reported on Bloomberg, supra Table 7. 
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Table 7: Outstanding Bank of America Debt by Currency 
(September 2011) 
 Freq. Percent Cum. Percent 
USD 824 82.4 82.4 
EUR 41 4.1 86.5 
AUD 35 3.5 90 
JPY 34 3.4 93.4 
SGD 10 1 94.4 
CHF 9 0.9 95.3 
NZD 9 0.9 96.2 
CAD 8 0.8 97 
GBP 6 0.6 97.6 
BRL 5 0.5 98.1 
MXN 4 0.4 98.5 
INR 3 0.3 98.8 
SEK 3 0.3 99.1 
NOK 2 0.2 99.3 
TRY 2 0.2 99.5 
ZAR 2 0.2 99.7 
CZK 1 0.1 99.8 
HKD 1 0.1 99.9 
RUB 1 0.1 100 
Source:  Bloomberg  
 
The bank also reports more than $354 billion in securities among its 
assets.  Table 8 provides some further information about those 
securities. 
Table 8: Bank of America Securities (June 2011) 
+ US Government Securities 49,269.15 
    US Treasury Securities 46,571.54 
    US Govt Agencies 2,697.61 
+ Municipals 7,645.96 
+ Asset Backed Securities 8,048.56 
+ Other Domestic Debt 3,624.13 
+ Foreign Debt Securities 4,579.59 
+ Equities 20,431.88 
Total Securities 351,463.11 
Source:  Bloomberg  
15
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The purpose of this Article is not to identify what might cause Bank 
of America to fail, but rather to examine, assuming such failure, how 
such failure might be addressed.  In that context, Table 8 is not so much 
relevant in identifying possible risk at the bank, but instead because 
which might assume that some of these assets could decline in value 
during a financial crisis that might accompany the failure of a major 
banking institution.  That is, many of Bank of America’s assets are apt 
to be correlated with its own financial condition, given its prominence in 
the financial markets. 
Independent of whatever might cause the bank to experience financial 
distress, a more generalized decline in financial markets would hit this 
part of Bank of America’s balance sheet.  It does bear noting that the 
U.S. Treasury portion of Table 8 will likely offset some of the 
downward movement in other parts of the bank’s securities holdings, 
given the typical flight to quality that occurs in times of financial stress. 
But this discussion of the Bank of America balance sheet has to this 
point considered the bank as a whole.  Financial institutions fail as a 
whole, but are resolved in pieces.  Even after the enactment of Dodd–
Frank, and as will be discussed more fully in Part II, upon failure a 
financial institution will be deconstructed into its constituent parts.  
Thus, while the consolidated balance sheet can highlight the scope of the 
issue at hand, ultimately only the individual, company-by-company 
balance sheets of a financial institution are relevant.  And, sometimes 
the focus on the traditional balance sheet can hide the realities of 
modern finance. 
Both points are well illustrated by the final table in this Part, which 
returns to MLI, the London-based broker–dealer discussed earlier.  
Table 9 again reproduces a table from the MLI Basel II report, this time 
disclosing MLI’s credit default swap exposure.43 
 
 43. For background on CDS contracts, see Stephen J. Lubben, Credit Derivatives and the Future 
of Chapter 11, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 405, 423–24 (2007). 
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In its overseas Basel II disclosure reports, Bank of America notes: 
At December 31, 2009, the amount of additional collateral and 
termination payments that would be required for such derivatives and 
trading agreements was approximately $2.1 billion if the long-term credit 
rating of BAC and its subsidiaries was incrementally downgraded by one 
level by all ratings agencies.  A second incremental one level downgrade 
by the ratings agencies would require approximately $1.2 billion in 
additional collateral.46 
That is, there is a contingent liability or obligation associated with the 
bank’s derivative trading, which turns on the status of Bank of 
America’s credit rating.  As seen in AIG, these sorts of collateral calls 
have the effect of draining desirable assets from a financial institution 
during the development of financial distress, potentially increasing the 
downward pressure on the institution.47 
Table 10: Notional Amount of Derivative Contracts, Top 5 Holding 





























Corporation 74,811,101 3,288,994 1,546,806 12,519,496 46,529,779 6,787,645 4,138,382 413,117 
3 
Morgan 
Stanley 56,401,634 158,931 1,038,336 7,918,712 35,162,310 6,365,230 5,758,115 442,532 
4 
Citigroup 




Group, Inc. 53,405,245 1,812,343 3,249,493 4,764,925 29,888,177 9,386,342 4,303,965 359,691 
 
The exchange of collateral in connection with derivatives trading and 
other transactions also exposes the bank and its counterparties to risks 
associated with the rehypothecation of the collateral.  As Bank of 
America explains in its 2010 10-K: 
The Corporation accepts collateral that it is permitted by contract or 
custom to sell or repledge and such collateral is recorded on the 
Consolidated Balance Sheet.  At December 31, 2010 and 2009, the fair 
value of this collateral was $401.7 billion and $418.2 billion of which 
$257.6 billion and $310.2 billion were sold or repledged.  The primary 
sources of this collateral are repurchase agreements and securities 
borrowed.  The Corporation also pledges securities and loans as collateral 
in transactions that include repurchase agreements, securities loaned, 
public and trust deposits, U.S. Treasury tax and loan notes, and other 
short-term borrowings.  This collateral can be sold or repledged by the 
 
 46. SELECT MAJOR SUBSIDIARIES, supra note 28. 
 47. See generally CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, THE AIG RESCUE, ITS IMPACT ON MARKETS, AND 
THE GOVERNMENT’S EXIT STRATEGY (2010). 
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counterparties to the transactions.48 
Rehypothecation of this sort can make it more difficult to unwind a 
financial institutions affairs in insolvency, as the debtor’s assets will be 
subject to competing and conflicting claims.49 
Returning to the specific case of MLI, importantly for purposes of 
this Article, upon the hypothetical failure of Bank of America, MLI has 
a substantial piece of the CDS market that will either have to moved to 
another financial institution with extreme haste, or the CDS market will 
experience significant dislocation as parties rush to terminate their MLI 
contracts and replace them with new trades.50 
And as discussed in the next part of this Article, MLI will remain 
outside of any Orderly Liquidation Proceeding commenced with regard 
to Bank of America, as MLI is based in London and therefore not 
subject to the FDIC’s or the U.S Congress’s jurisdiction.  This is an 
issue for the roughly 30% of Bank of America entities that operate 
outside the United States, but it is especially important with regard to 
entities like MLI that have significant operations. 
Finally, as discussed in the next part of this Article, different financial 
institutions are subject to different resolution procedures, even if the 
institutions in question are all subsidiaries of the same financial holding 
company.  Accordingly, Table 11 identifies the domestic Bank of 
America subsidiaries that are subject to special regulatory treatment, and 
thus special resolution procedures. 
The table is apt to be both over and under inclusive, since an outsider 
obviously may not correctly identify the purpose of all of Bank of 
America’s myriad subsidiaries.51  Also note that the table only includes 
domestic entities: there are clearly several foreign depository banks, 




 48. Bank of America Corp., Form 10-K, supra note 24, at 142–43. 
 49. Stephen J. Lubben, The Bankruptcy Code Without Safe Harbors, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 123, 
n.20 (2010). 
 50. Id. at 123–24; see also generally Patricia A. McCoy et al., Systemic Risk Through 
Securitization: The Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REV. 493 (2009); 
Michael Simkovic, Secret Liens and the Financial Crisis of 2008, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 253 (2009). 
 51. For example, I have attempted to exclude insurance agencies from the list, but sometimes a 
particular subsidiary’s function is less than clear. 
 52. Likely examples include ML Insurance (IOM) Limited (incorporated in Douglas, Isle of 
Man), Merrill Lynch Credit Reinsurance Limited (Hamilton, Bermuda), Merrill Lynch Bank (Suisse) 
S.A. (Geneva, Switzerland), and Merrill Lynch Yatirim Bank A.S. (Istanbul, Turkey). 
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Assets (if available; 
USD millions) 
Insurance Companies:    
Balboa Insurance Company Irvine, CA California 2,581.00 
Balboa Life Insurance Company Irvine, CA California 43.25 
Balboa Life Insurance Company of New 
York Irvine, CA New York 18.30 
Meritplan Insurance Company Irvine, CA California 184.00 
Newport Insurance Company Irvine, CA Arizona 146.10 
Bank of America Reinsurance Corporation Burlington, VT Vermont  
CW Reinsurance Company Burlington, VT Vermont  
Investor Protection Insurance Company Burlington, VT Vermont  
General Fidelity Life Insurance Company Columbia, SC South Carolina 210.30 
Independence One Life Insurance Company Phoenix, AZ Arizona  
RIHT Life Insurance Company Phoenix, AZ Arizona  
Summit Credit Life Insurance Company Phoenix, AZ Arizona  
Banks (depository and trust):    
Bank of America, National Association Charlotte, NC USA 1,454.05 
Bank of America Oregon, National 
Association Portland, OR USA 8.82 
Bank of America Rhode Island, National 
Association Providence, RI USA 17.81 
Bank of America California, National 
Association San Francisco, CA USA 15.98 
Bank of America National Trust Delaware Wilmington, DE USA 2.90 
U.S. Trust Company of Delaware Wilmington, DE Delaware  
Broker-Dealers (active only, including all types of brokers and 
dealers):   
Merrill Lynch Government Securities Inc. New York, NY Delaware  
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith 
Incorporated New York, NY Delaware 297,900.00 
Merrill Lynch Professional Clearing Corp. New York, NY Delaware 18,145.00 
Banc of America Specialist, Inc. New York, NY New York 6,028.00 
 
Sources:  Bank of America Corporation 2010 10-K; OCC; FDIC Call Reports; SEC; FINRA; Texas Department of 
Insurance and NAIC Web Pages 
II. RESOLUTION LAW FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
American regulation of financial institutions has historically focused 
on a function-by-function approach, and this holds true for the 
insolvency law of financial institutions as well.  Each specialized area of 
the financial institution is typically subject to its own special insolvency 
regime, meaning that a large financial holding company with myriad 
subsidiaries—like Bank of America—will be subjected to several 
20
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typically feature court oversight. 
As with banks, appointment of a receiver suspends the powers of 
management and places the control of the company in the hands of the 
receiver.55  Claims are fixed as of the date of the appointment.  An 
insurer’s policies are typically deemed cancelled on appointment of a 
receiver.  The estate is not liable for future losses, but policyholders 
have valid claims for losses incurred to that point.  In many cases, the 
policyholders will also have claims for breach of contract against the 
estate.  And often, policyholder claims have a priority over other 
unsecured creditor claims.56 
The Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA) is the final specialized 
resolution procedure relevant to this discussion.  Enacted in the 1970s to 
deal with the failure of brokerage houses during the “back office 
crisis,”57 SIPA provides for some basic insurance protection for 
customers of securities brokers, but not commodities or futures brokers, 
and sets forth a special insolvency scheme for brokerages.58 
SIPA specifically provides for the application of chapters 1, 3 and 5 
and subchapters I and II of chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code to the 
extent such provisions are not inconsistent with SIPA.59  Both chapter 
11 and SIPA proceedings draw on the same general parts of the 
Bankruptcy Code to resolve claims and define the basic elements of the 
process.60  But SIPA is strictly a liquidation procedure, which makes its 
outcome both more certain and less flexible than a chapter 11 case. 
SIPA proceedings are commenced in district court and typically 
 
Court and a State Insurance Receivership Court, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 567, 574 (2002). 
 55. Delaware v. FMC Ins. Co., Inc., No. 6712-VCP (Del. Ch. Aug. 17, 2011) (order granting 
preliminary injunction), available at 
http://www.delawareinsurance.gov/departments/berg/FederalMotor_Files/FederalMotors_StipLiqInjOrd
er-WithConvSignature-20110818.pdf. 
 56. Patrick Collins, HMO Eligibility for Bankruptcy: The Case for Federal Definitions of 
109(b)(2) Entities, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 425, 431 (1994). 
 57. The back office crisis developed in the late 1960s, when securities trades were still processed 
in paper form, but the size of the stock market began to overtake brokers’ ability to process the 
paperwork.  Because of an underinvestment in infrastructure, several brokers failed and others came 
close to failing.  See Thomas W. Joo, Who Watches the Watchers? The Securities Investor Protection 
Act, Investor Confidence, and the Subsidization of Failure, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1071, 1076–78 (1999); 
see also The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970: An Early Assessment, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 802 
(1973). 
 58. Richard Carlucci, Harmonizing U.S. Securities and Futures Regulations, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. 
FIN. & COM. L. 461, 473 (2008); Onnig H. Dombalagian, Self and Self-Regulation: Resolving the SRO 
Identity Crisis, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 317, 326 (2007). 
 59. 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(b) (2012). 
 60. SIPA itself is only applicable to broker–dealers required to register under the 1934 Exchange 
Act, leaving small broker–dealers and certain foreign broker–dealers subject to certain specialized 
provisions of chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.  By all accounts, these exceptions are a small minority 
of broker–dealers. 
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quickly removed to the local bankruptcy court.61  A trustee is appointed 
by SIPC—or SIPC itself acts as trustee when a small brokerage is 
involved—and the trustee directed to distribute securities to customers 
to the greatest extent practicable in satisfaction of their claims against 
the debtor.  Through such distributions, the customers of a broker–dealer 
receive a priority over other, general unsecured creditors who have to 
await a more bankruptcy-like distribution, if there are any assets to make 
such a distribution.62 
SIPA typically applies to investment banks, or at least key parts of 
investment banks (i.e., the broker–dealer bits).  Thus, while Lehman 
Brothers Holdings, Inc. famously filed a chapter 11 petition on 
September 15, 2008, one week latter its key broker–dealer subsidiary, 
Lehman Brothers, Inc., filed a SIPA petition to facilitate the Lehman 
Brothers Holdings’ sale of assets to Barclay’s Capital.   
In a world before Dodd–Frank, any part of the financial company not 
covered by one of the foregoing special insolvency regimes, including 
bank holding companies, was resolved under the Bankruptcy Code.63  In 
theory, many foreign parts of the financial institution could also file a 
bankruptcy petition, although there may be difficulties in getting such a 
petition respected, especially if the subsidiary in question was engaged 
in significant activity in the foreign jurisdiction. 
How does the creation of OLA change this?  Table 13 summarizes the 
change, but, in short, OLA potentially replaces chapter 11 as the 
resolution tool for bank holding companies and their non-regulated 
subsidiaries.  It only potentially displaces chapter 11 because chapter 11 
remains in place unless financial regulators decide to invoke OLA,64 
through a comically byzantine process that culminates with the D.C. 
District court having 24 hours to say “no” under very limited 
circumstances.65 
And, OLA does not supplant FDIC bank receiverships, state 
 
 61. 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(b)(4) (2012); see also Peloro v. United States, 488 F.3d 163, 172 (3d Cir. 
2007). 
 62. 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-3(a) (2012). 
 63. Until passage of the Dodd–Frank Act, a Bank Holding Company was subject to regulation by 
the Federal Reserve, but there was no specialized insolvency system for these entities.  The Bank 
Holding Company Act defines “bank holding company” as any company that “has control over any 
bank or over any company that is or becomes a bank holding company by virtue” of the Act.  “Any 
company has control over a bank or over any company if: “(A) the company directly or indirectly or 
acting through one or more other persons owns, controls, or has power to vote 25 per centum or more of 
any class of voting securities of the bank or company; (B) the company controls in any manner the 
election of a majority of the directors or trustees of the bank or company; or (C) the Board determines, 
after notice and opportunity for hearing, that the company directly or indirectly exercises a controlling 
influence over the management or policies of the bank or company.”  12 U.S.C. § 1841(a) (2011). 
 64. 12 U.S.C. § 5382(c)(1) (2010); see id. §§ 5388, 5383(b)(2) (2010). 
 65. Id. § 5382 (2010); see also id. § 5383 (2011). 
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insurance receiverships, or SIPA liquidation procedures, although the 
story with regard to SIPA is not quite as clear that would suggest.66  As 
explained below, OLA largely overrides the provisions of SIPA, without 
wanting to appear to do so. 
In essence, OLA expands the FDIC’s bank receivership powers to 
cover a greater part of the financial institution.67  This allows the FDIC 
to conduct a purchase and assumption transaction with regard to non-
bank parts of the institution, or transfer the institution to a newly created 
“bridge bank.”68  The latter allows the FDIC to split the good assets 
from the bad, in a process that is very much like that used in “363 sales” 
under chapter 11, widely publicized by the automotive chapter 11 
cases.69 
The key distinction with chapter 11 is that the FDIC acts without 
court oversight or the need to give notice before it acts.70  Thus, while 
the Lehman 363 sale happened after one week’s notice to the 
stakeholders, the OLA equivalent could happen within seconds of the 
OLA proceeding’s commencement.71 
The statute grants FDIC a one-day stay on counterparties’ ability to 
terminate their derivative contracts.72  This contrasts with the 
Bankruptcy Code, which, particularly after 2005, excepts a wide range 
of derivative contracts—and things that look like derivative contracts—
from the normal operation of the Code. 
And equally importantly, the OLA procedure can be self-funded by 
the FDIC.73  This obviates the need to secure private debtor-in-
possession (DIP) financing,74  something that might be especially 
difficult to obtain during a financial crisis, especially if one considers 
the scale of the funding needs of most large financial institutions.75 
 
 66. Id. §§ 5383(e), 5385, 5381(a)(8) (2010). 
 67. Id. § 5384(b) (2010). 
 68. See id. § 5390 (2010).  
 69. See generally Stephen J. Lubben, No Big Deal: The GM and Chrysler Cases in Context, 83 
AM. BANKR. L. J. 531 (2009); Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Stephen J. Lubben, Sales or Plans: A Comparative 
Account of the “New” Corporate Reorganization, 56 MCGILL L.J. 591 (2011). 
 70. Paul L. Lee, The Dodd–Frank Act Orderly Liquidation Authority: A Preliminary Analysis 
and Critique - Part II, 128 BANKING L.J. 867, 899 (2011). 
 71. Mark A. McDermott & David M. Turetsky, Restructuring Large, Systemically-Important, 
Financial Companies: An Analysis of the Orderly Liquidation Authority, Title II of the Dodd–Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 19 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 401, 421 (2011). 
 72. Douglas E. Deutsch & Eric Daucher, Dodd–Frank’s Liquidation Scheme: Basics for 
Bankruptcy Practitioners, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July–Aug. 2011. 
 73. Jamieson L. Hardee, The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: 
The Orderly Liquidation Authority: The Creditor’s Perspective, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 259, 275 
(2011). 
 74. See 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2012). 
 75. See 12 U.S.C. § 5384(d) (2010). 
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terms of taxpayer costs, moral hazard, and reduced market discipline, 
will sometimes overwhelm the costs of allowing any particular 
institution to fail.  But in the specific cases of depository banks, since 
the 1930s the general assumption has been that any bank failure might 
result in contagion, hence the need for system wide deposit insurance.  
And in times of market-wide dislocation, it has long been accepted that 
it can be socially useful for central banks to provide liquidity, and even 
recapitalization, to avoid the panic that would result from the failure of a 
specific financial institution.80 
That such lending now can be done only after the failure of the 
institution is announced represents a bet that the announcement of an 
OLA proceeding will not itself overwhelm the benefits of the FDIC’s 
lending to the institution.  It seems equally likely that putting an 
institution into OLA will trigger a chain reaction of panic and failures 
throughout the system that could result in a severe contraction of money 
and credit in the financial system, which could result in the need to 
conduct several OLA proceedings in parallel. 
There is also the question of whether the analogy that Dodd–Frank 
makes between bank receivership and financial institution failure holds 
up to careful scrutiny.81  For example, the FDIC’s technique of choice is 
to find a buyer to whom to sell the troubled bank, but in times of 
systemic crisis there might well be no buyers large enough or confident 
enough to perform a similar function with regard to a large financial 
institution.82  At the very least, there might be a need for FDIC to 
heavily subsidize the sale, a point in some tension with the notion that 
Dodd–Frank has ended bailouts.  Moreover, given the limited number of 
buyers in even the best of times, arguably the market for very large 
financial institutions will never be competitive, and will always function 
as a “buyers’ market.” 
Similarly, although the FDIC has considerable experience resolving 
banks under its bank receivership powers, it has no experience resolving 
a domestic or global diversified financial institution.83  The FDIC could 
 
 80. Paul Krugman, Financial Romanticism, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2011, 6:27 PM), 
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/financial-romanticism/. 
 81. Paul L. Lee, The Dodd–Frank Act Orderly Liquidation Authority: A Preliminary Analysis 
and Critique - Part I, 128 BANKING L.J. 771, 781 (2011). 
 82. David Zaring, A Lack of Resolution, 60 EMORY L.J. 97, 109–17 (2010).  
 83. The new regime is also different from a bank resolution in that losses must be imposed on 
the unsecured creditors, even to the extent of clawing back payments previously made under the FDIC’s 
liquidity powers.  Any remaining losses after creditors have repaid their share are to be covered by ex 
post assessments on surviving large financial institutions.  In short, unlike bank receivership where an 
ex ante insurance fund exists to pay losses, Dodd–Frank rests on the premise that such a fund can be 
created ex post.  Prefunding may have made OLA more usable, and one can surmise this is exactly why 
the argument that pre-funding would “institutionalize bailouts” was surfaced.  One can also reasonably 
doubt Congress’ will to impose ex post assessments on financial institutions in the face of concerted 
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be aided in the OLA process by the requirement that financial 
institutions file resolution plans before the first signs of trouble, and the 
powers that regulators have to order financial institutions to rationalize 
their corporate structures.  But some commentators have raised 
legitimate issues about whether regulators will have the long-term 
willpower to enforce these provisions to their fullest extent.84 
The interface between OLA and FDIC bank receiverships, state 
insurance receiverships, or SIPA liquidation procedures is also 
somewhat problematic.  As noted at the outset, OLA does not supplant 
any of these specialized procedures.85 
And particularly with regard to bank and insurance company 
receiverships, the status quo prevails and the FDIC as OLA receiver will 
have to interact with the receivers of these pieces of the financial 
institution.  Of course, in the case of a bank, the FDIC will be 
interacting with itself, but the FDIC as bank receiver operates under a 
different set of statutory instructions86 than the FDIC as OLA receiver.87   
In the case of broker–dealers, the process is somewhat more 
confused.88  A close reading of the relevant provision actually suggests 
that the FDIC can be appointed receiver of a broker–dealer under 
OLA.89  But the statute then instructs the FDIC to appoint SIPC as 
trustee for the broker–dealer.  The Securities Investor Protection 
Corporation (SIPC) is then instructed to “promptly” file a SIPA petition 
with the “with any Federal district court of competent jurisdiction 
specified in section 78u or 78aa of Title 15.”90 
Thus commences a SIPA case, with some notable exceptions.91  First, 
SIPC normally appoints an outside trustee in all but the smallest cases.  
Under OLA, SIPC, which lacks experience liquidating large broker–
dealers, is placed in charge.  But SIPC will not have the full powers of a 
 
lobbying and general concerns about causing a new round of distress in the financial industry.  See 
generally Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd–Frank’s 
Dangers and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 151 (2011).  But 
cf.12 U.S.C. § 5394 (2010). 
 84. See Jonathan R. Macey & James P. Holdcroft, Jr., Failure Is an Option: An Ersatz-Antitrust 
Approach to Financial Regulation, 120 YALE L.J. 1368, 1390 (2011). 
 85. Hollace T. Cohen, Orderly Liquidation Authority: A New Insolvency Regime to Address 
Systemic Risk, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 1143, 1151 (2011). 
 86. E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4) (2011). 
 87. Id. § 5386 (2010). 
 88. See id. § 5385 (2010). 
 89. Id. § 5385(a) (“Upon the appointment of the Corporation as receiver for any covered broker 
or dealer, the Corporation shall . . . .”). 
 90. Id. § 5385(a)(2)(A).  Notably, this is not apt to be the D.C. District Court, who may have had 
the initial task of reviewing the OLA petition. 
 91. That Dodd–Frank orders a court to enter a petition in these cases might be subject to some 
constitutional concerns. Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 429–30 (1995). 
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normal SIPA trustee; instead it is powerless to interfere with the FDIC’s 
decision to transfer assets to a new purchaser or bridge institution. 
SIPC’s role is primarily limited to dealing with the debris remaining 
after the FDIC takes charge of the broker–dealer.  SIPC is placed in the 
difficult position.  For example, they are told to essentially leave the 
FDIC to do its thing, while the statute also provides that SIPC should 
not do anything to “adversely affect the rights of a customer to customer 
property or customer name securities.”92  Fortunately for SIPC, the 
statute also tells the district court to stand down once the SIPA petition 
is granted.93 
Essentially, Dodd–Frank uses the OLA process to override the 
existing SIPA process, without having the willingness to say so.  In this 
light, the otherwise puzzling decision to appoint SIPC as trustee makes 
sense, because an outsider might find it difficult to be a “trustee” under 
the conditions imposed by Dodd–Frank. 
OLA will give the FDIC strong powers over much of a financial 
institution, save for insurance companies and banks.  Coordination of 
the bank resolution process with the OLA process should be possible—
given the unitary identity of the OLA trustee and the bank receiver—but 
it will require the FDIC to gloss over its schizophrenic responsibilities 
under Dodd–Frank on the one hand, and the general banking statutes on 
the other. 
OLA is also somewhat less “global” than chapter 11—most of its 
provisions are expressly limited to domestic entities, whereas chapter 11 
potentially applies to any entity with assets in the United States.94  
Given the nature of modern financial institutions—there really is no 
such thing as a purely domestic financial institution—coordination 
across borders is key, and that issue remains unresolved by Dodd–
Frank.95 
Thus we can expect that any cross-border coordination of resolution 
procedures will have to happen on an informal basis among regulators.  
As seen in Lehman, however, sometimes the regulators are not fully 
aware of the global insolvency system.  One can only hope that this 
improves in light of recent events.  But no matter what happens in this 
regard investors are unlikely to get the certainty they might have hoped 
for from Dodd–Frank. 
We should also remember that a lot has changed in the past few years 
that might make financial institution failure less likely, or at least less 
 
 92. 12 U.S.C. § 5385(d). 
 93. Id. § 5385(c). 
 94. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2010). 
 95. See MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT ET AL., BALANCING THE BANKS: GLOBAL LESSONS FROM THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS122–29 (2010). 
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traumatic.  New regulations of financial institutions under Dodd–Frank, 
Basel III, and other initiatives all will influence how OLA operates, and 
whether it ever needs to be invoked.  More broadly, the better the ex 
ante regulation, the less likely OLA will ever be needed. 
III. BANK OF AMERICA IN OLA 
Bank of America’s entry into the orderly liquidation process would 
trigger state insurance receiverships in California, New York, Arizona, 
South Carolina, and Vermont.  Six FDIC bank receiverships would 
commence.  At least four SIPA brokerage liquidations would be filed.96  
The holding company and any unregulated, domestic subsidiaries would 
enter OLA proceedings, where they would come under the control of the 
FDIC. 
The assets in the foregoing entities would be immediately severed 
from the assets in key foreign subsidiaries, like Merrill Lynch S.A. or 
Banc of America Securities Limited.97  Based on the experience in 
Lehman, this may result in these subsidiaries losing access to shared 
computer and cash management systems, threatening their ability to 
survive as independent entities.  Thus, even if these companies are 
separately capitalized and otherwise viable, they will experience 
extreme business disruption unless contingency plans are in place well 
before the occurrence of financial distress. 
Given that it was reported that a large part—approximately 85%—of 
Bank of America assets are reportedly in the United States, it would be 
easy to assume that the FDIC in one of its capacities will quickly take 
charge of the bulk of the company.98  But it is equally possible that 
foreign subsidiaries of the bank might have claims on those assets, no 
matter what their location.  Moreover, the reporting of derivatives trades 
on a “net” basis means that assuming asset location correlates with 
importance may be extremely imprudent.  In short, it is unclear precisely 
how much of Bank of America will fall under FDIC control, acting as 
either OLA trustee or bank receiver. 
But whatever part of the bank falls within the FDIC’s jurisdiction, it 
will have to act fast to protect the value of the debtor, especially with 
regard to its derivatives trading book (assuming it is domestically held at 
 
 96. This assumes FDIC would attempt to resolve the entire financial institution.  More recently 
the FDIC has suggested that it might simply attempt to put the parent company into OLA, and use the 
funding described in this Part to keep the subsidiaries operating outside of OLA.  While such an 
approach would be sensible, FDIC would undoubtedly face some political risks, as this would amount to 
a bailout of creditors—including derivatives counterparties—at the subsidiary level. 
 97. See supra Table 2 for a list of Bank of America’s self-identified key operating subsidiaries. 
 98. See supra Table 3. 
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the time of the OLA filing).  As such, the path FDIC will follow seems 
relatively clear.  First, the FDIC will move the valuable and systemically 
important parts of the company to a bridge bank.  Next, it will move the 
entire derivative portfolio—or at least the entire domestic derivatives 
portfolio—to the bridge bank as well.  While here it might be tempting 
to only move the “good” or in the money trades to the bridge bank, 
Dodd–Frank’s prohibition on splitting positions against any single 
counterparty, and the reality that the FDIC must act with 24 hours, 
makes any deep analysis of derivative trades unlikely.  This sort of 
wholesale transfer does, of course, amount to a windfall for some 
counterparties who suddenly get the benefit of a much more creditor-
worthy partner.  The third step would be to remove Bank of America’s 
senior management.  Dodd–Frank requires no less. 
Finally, the FDIC would have to arrange a sensible liquidation of the 
remainder of the Bank of America.  That is, the scraps left out of the 
new bridge bank would have to be financed to facilitate their liquidation.  
Eventually it seems likely that some sort of liquidating trust, as is often 
used in large chapter 11 cases, might be used to allow the creditors of 
the “bad bank” to manage their own recovery in some sort of collective 
sense.  The trick here will be managing the tension between creditors 
who want rapid repayment, while avoiding fire sales of distressed 
securities, which might have further effects on an already depressed 
market.  That, at a very abstract level, is how OLA might be applied to 
Bank of America.  Of course, each of these broad steps raises important 
concerns and questions. 
Most fundamentally, will it be possible to cleanly separate Bank of 
America into its good and bad parts?  This is the area where the FDIC, 
through the living wills provisions and its other oversight tools, must 
both understand and reformat Bank of America in a way that will 
facilitate the transfer to the bridge bank.  At present, it seems highly 
unlikely that the bank, with its more than 2,000 subsidiaries, could be 
split into good and bad banks without serious disruption to the bank, and 
thus the entire financial system. 
This is also an area where the international component of the bank 
should be addressed.  In particular, the living will for any global 
financial institution should explain how the foreign pieces of the bank 
would be separated from the American bank. 
As Richard W. Fisher, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Dallas, stated recently, “there is scant chance that managers of $1 
trillion or $2 trillion banking enterprises can possibly ‘know their 
customer,’ follow time-honored principles of banking and fashion 
reliable risk management models for organizations as complex as these 
30
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megabanks have become.”99  This reality would become even more 
acute during a financial crisis, when the FDIC as receiver is even less 
likely to have such knowledge. 
Nonetheless, FDIC would have to operate the bridge bank, which 
contains the better parts of Bank of America.  This will mean funding 
the bridge bank with the idea that FDIC will get back its costs from the 
industry at some point in the future. 
Here, I think we have to worry about FDIC’s ability to run a major 
financial institution, markedly larger than any bank it has ever operated 
under its receivership powers.  Moreover, market conditions are apt to 
be rather turbulent following the takeover of an institution of Bank of 
America’s size.  Traditionally the FDIC has favored sales to other banks 
when it has had to deal with a big bank failure.100  But will anyone be 
able or interested in buying Bank of America following its failure?  
Certainly it would seem to make little sense to add even the good bits of 
the bank to any of the existing, very large domestic banks.101 
That leaves the second tier banks—think US Bancorp and PNC 
Financial Services Group—as potential suitors, or foreign financial 
institutions, like Barclay’s, who bought Lehman out of chapter 11.  The 
question is whether any of the second tier banks would want to join the 
top tier, and whether regulators should allow them to do so.  A similar 
calculus will be at work with foreign entities, whose regulators must 
worry about recreating “too big to fail” problems in the buying 
institution. 
And also remember that Bank of America has been somewhat 
dismembered at this point—both by the limited scope of OLA and by 
the international pieces being pulled out—so some of its attraction may 
be gone.  Lehman had exactly one bidder for its assets, and now that 
bank has a U.S. broker–dealer.  Who remains? 
FDIC gets out of this problem in their Lehman hypothetical by 
assuming a buyer who is willing to pay book value—but the present 
exercise is aimed at a somewhat more realistic analysis. 
As an alternative, FDIC could continue to fund the bridge bank until 
the markets stabilize, and the bridge could then be recapitalized through 
 
 99. Richard W. Fisher, Remarks before Columbia University’s Politics and Business Club: 
Taming the Too-Big-to-Fails: Will Dodd–Frank Be the Ticket or Is Lap-Band Surgery Required? (Nov. 
15, 2011), available at http://dallasfed.org/news/speeches/fisher/2011/fs111115.cfm.  As a remedy, 
Fisher proposed “downsizing the behemoths over time into institutions that can be prudently 
managed . . . .” 
 100. E.g., Press Release, FDIC, U.S. Bank National Association, Cincinnati, Ohio, Assumes All 
of the Deposits of BankEast, Knoxville, Tennessee (Jan. 27, 2012), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2012/pr12013.html. 
 101. And doing so would require waiver of Dodd–Frank’s concentration limits. 
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an IPO.102  This would expose FDIC to high degrees of market and 
political risk, but end in the best overall outcome.  Nonetheless, this 
model looks much more like the model used in the GM case—which 
most people would not term a “liquidation,” despite Dodd–Frank’s 
putative rule that all future financial institutions should suffer that fate. 
Ultimately, there may be many good reasons to break up the largest 
U.S. banks.  In many respects, they are not unlike the conglomerates of 
the 1960s, pursuing several lines of business on the basis of purported 
economies of scale that may exist more in the minds of their CEO than 
in reality.103  But in any event, it seems unlikely that the ideal moment to 
break up these banks will be at the point of crisis.  And it seems equally 
unlikely that these institutions will divide neatly along geographical 
lines—yet that is precisely what Dodd–Frank’s OLA is premised on. 
IV. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
Given OLA’s admitted shakiness, why not use the Bankruptcy Code?  
After all, chapter 11 benefits from decades of understanding about how 
to restructure a financially distressed company.  And several extremely 
large companies, including financial institutions like Lehman and 
Drexel Burnham Lambert, have successfully used chapter 11. 
The most prominent proposal to use the Code in place of OLA 
actually calls for a new chapter 14, proposed by members of the 
Resolution Project at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution.104  In 
short, proposed chapter 14 would apply to all financial institutions with 
assets of more than $100 billion.105  Petitions could be filed either 
voluntarily (by the institution) or involuntarily (by regulators).  Cases 
would be overseen by “a small . . . and specialized panel of district court 
judges and special masters . . . .”106  Otherwise, the cases would proceed 
under normal provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, subject to modified 
treatment of derivatives and repos, as outlined in a companion article by 
Skeel and Jackson.107  The stated goal is to take the government out of 
 
 102. See Michael Simkovic, Competition and Crisis in Mortgage Securitization, 88 Ind. L.J. 
(forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1924831. 
 103. Sheila Bair, Why It’s Time to Break Up the ‘Too Big to Fail’ Banks, CNNMONEY (Jan. 18, 
2012, 10:56 AM), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2012/01/18/big-banks-break-up-bair/?iid=SF_F_Lead. 
 104. Thomas H. Jackson et al., Resolution of Failed Financial Institutions: Orderly Liquidation 
Authority and a New Chapter 14, in STUDIES BY THE RESOLUTION PROJECT AT STANFORD 
UNIVERSITY’S HOOVER INSTITUTION WORKING GROUP ON ECONOMIC POLICY (2011), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2011/June/20110620/OP-1418/OP-
1418_061511_81311_544434921739_1.pdf. 
 105. Twenty-four bank or financial holding companies fit that definition at the end of 2011, major 
regional banks like Union Bank of California and KeyCorp, would not be covered. 
 106. Jackson et al., supra note 104, at 1–6. 
 107. David A. Skeel, Jr. & Thomas H. Jackson, Transaction Consistency and the New Finance in 
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the insolvency process, as the proponents argue that involves political 
distortion of the market. 
The key difficulty with any such use of the Bankruptcy Code rests on 
funding.  The chapter 14 proposal supposes the use of a modified 
version of the present section 364 of the Bankruptcy Code, the statutory 
support for the well-known DIP loans in chapter 11 cases.108 
Before the financial crisis, Lyondell Chemical received the largest 
commercial DIP loan on record: $8 billion.  That loan was arranged by 
Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, and the Royal Bank of 
Scotland, and funded by thirteen financial institutions, including 
commercial banks, investment banks, hedge funds, and private equity 
funds. 
General Motors received a $33 billion DIP loan, from the U.S. 
Treasury.109  That remains the largest DIP loan ever.  The total value of 
the ten largest DIP loans in the 2011 was $3 billion, one third of which 
involved a single loan arranged by Bank of America.  In 2010, the total 
value of the fifteen largest DIP loans was $7 billion, of which $725 
million, comprising four loans, was arranged by Bank of America. Bank 
of America currently has liquidity needs of more than $400 billion. 
Relying on the commercial DIP market—especially during a financial 
crisis—for a DIP loan of anything near this size seems more than 
implausible.  The number of financial institutions that would have to be 
involved would be massive—perhaps as many as 650, if the proportion 
were the same as the Lyondell DIP loan.  There is no way a loan of this 
size could be arranged without starting a run on Bank of America.  
Dodd–Frank solves this problem with the funding mechanism discussed 
earlier, and that mechanism or something like it is a prerequisite to a 
viable resolution authority.110 
And once we concede the need for government funding, the notion 
that the government will not ultimately be in control of the process 
seems little more than naïve.  After all, until the automotive cases, it was 
widely agreed that a private lender was entitled to “call the shots” in any 
case in which it provided the debtor’s means to keep operating.111 
 
Bankruptcy, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 152, 153–54 (2012). 
 108. Jameson Rice, Changes in Debtor-in-Possession Financing Following the Financial 
Collapse of 2008, 29 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 312, 313 (2010). 
 109. Michael D. De La Merced, G.M. Wins Final Approval of DIP Financing, N.Y. TIMES (June 
25, 2009, 12:24 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/06/25/gm-wins-final-approval-of-dip-
financing/. 
 110. Michael S. Barr, The Financial Crisis and the Path of Reform, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 101 
(2012). 
 111. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751, 
784–85 (2002); M. Todd Henderson, Paying CEOs in Bankruptcy: Executive Compensation when 
Agency Costs Are Low, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1543, 1570 (2007); David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors’ Ball: 
The “New” New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 923 (2003).  After the 
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Similarly, the chapter 14 proposal touts its benefit as a transparent, 
court-based process, it does little to address the speed needed to address 
financial distress in this context.  The new OLA obtains most of its 
benefits from its rather limited version of due process, which is both 
troubling and necessary.112  Lehman was able to use the ordinary 
bankruptcy process to achieve a sale of its broker–dealer within one 
week, but that only came about as a result of the Federal Reserve’s 
willingness to support the sale process.  Arguably the Fed no longer has 
that power, and the proponents of chapter 14 do not seem to provide any 
alternative. 
More importantly, remember again that Lehman is comparatively 
small when measured against the likes of Bank of America.  The 
financial markets need to know the plan, and they need to know it 
quickly when a major bank fails.113  OLA clearly wins on this point, 
and, as noted above, many of the due process concerns will fade if FDIC 
can provide greater clarity on when OLA might be invoked.114 
Finally, it would seem that the chapter 14 proponents wanted judicial 
expertise, but were unwilling to embrace that expertise when it came in 
the form of non-Article III bankruptcy judges.115  If true restructuring 
experience is desired, the bankruptcy judges in Delaware and the 
Southern District of New York seem like the obvious choice, but the 
chapter 14 proposal instead goes with district court judges, who see 
chapter 11 cases on appeal, if at all.116  As between a district judge and 
FDIC, it appears that there is little to be gain from replacing OLA with 
chapter 14.  In short, while a bankruptcy-based process would 
undoubtedly be preferable, given the gains in transparency and 
legitimacy, it would necessarily involve OLA-like funding and timing 
provisions.117  This is something more than bankruptcy with a few 
tweaks. 
And chapter 14 does nothing to solve the international component of 
the problem, which arguably is the biggest issue looming over the entire 
topic.  After all, while Lehman is out of chapter 11, its New York 
 
automotive cases, certain proponents of that view seemed to change their mind.  See Lubben, No Big 
Deal, supra note 69; see also Mark J. Roe & David A. Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 
MICH. L. REV. 727, 731–32 (2010). 
 112. Randall D. Guynn, Are Bailouts Inevitable?, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 153 (2012). 
 113. Alison M. Hashmall, After the Fall: A New Framework to Regulate “Too Big to Fail” Non-
Bank Financial Institutions, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 829, 851 (2010). 
 114. Acknowledging that FDIC is only partially able to commit to any strategy in this regard, 
given the role of the Secretary. 
 115. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). 
 116. Troy A. McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy Courts, 62 STAN. 
L. REV. 747, 781 (2010). 
 117. See Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 487 (2011). 
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broker–dealer and its London broker–dealer continue to fight over 
ownership of assets in both bankruptcy estates.  Given that all large 
financial institutions are international financial institutions, the failure to 
tackle the key issue leaves the biggest piece of the problem unaddressed. 
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